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Abstract
Adaptive attacks have (rightfully) become the de facto standard for evaluating defenses
to adversarial examples. We find, however, that typical adaptive evaluations are incomplete.
We demonstrate that thirteen defenses recently published at ICLR, ICML and NeurIPS—and
chosen for illustrative and pedagogical purposes—can be circumvented despite attempting to
perform evaluations using adaptive attacks. While prior evaluation papers focused mainly on
the end result—showing that a defense was ineffective—this paper focuses on laying out the
methodology and the approach necessary to perform an adaptive attack. We hope that these
analyses will serve as guidance on how to properly perform adaptive attacks against defenses to
adversarial examples, and thus will allow the community to make further progress in building
more robust models.
∗Equal contribution
1
ar
X
iv
:2
00
2.
08
34
7v
1 
 [c
s.L
G]
  1
9 F
eb
 20
20
Contents
1 Introduction 3
2 Background 4
3 Methodology 6
4 Recurring Attack Themes 7
5 k-Winners Take All 8
6 The Odds are Odd 11
7 Are Generative Classifiers More Robust? 14
8 Robust Sparse Fourier Transform 17
9 Rethinking Softmax Cross Entropy 18
10 Error Correcting Codes 20
11 Ensemble Diversity 22
12 EMPIR 24
13 Temporal Dependency 25
14 Mixup Inference 28
15 ME-Net 30
16 Asymmetrical Adversarial Training 32
17 Turning a Weakness into a Strength 35
18 Conclusion 38
2
1 Introduction
Over the last five years the research community has attempted to develop defenses to adversarial
examples (Szegedy et al., 2014; Biggio et al., 2013). This has proven extraordinarily difficult.
Indeed, a common theme has been proposing defenses that—due to having been tested only using a
limited number of static, and relatively weak, attacks—were promptly circumvented by a stronger
attack (Carlini & Wagner, 2017a; Athalye et al., 2018a).
Recent community efforts and guidelines to improve defense evaluations have had a noticeably
positive impact on their quality. In particular, there has been a significant uptake of evaluations
against adaptive attacks, i.e., attacks that were specifically designed to target a given defense—the
ratio of defenses evaluated against adaptive attacks has increased from close to zero in 2017 (Carlini
& Wagner, 2017a) to one third in 2018 (Athalye et al., 2018a) and to nearly all of them today.1
This leads to the question:
With their much-improved evaluation practices, are these defenses truly robust?
We find that this is not the case. Specifically, in an analysis of thirteen defenses that were se-
lected from recent ICLR, ICML, and NeurIPS conferences for the purpose of being illustrative and
pedagogically interesting, we find that we can circumvent all of them and substantially reduce the
accuracy from what was originally claimed.
Importantly, while almost all of these defenses performed an evaluation involving adaptive at-
tacks, these evaluations ended up not being sufficient. For example, it is common for papers to
repurpose existing “adaptive” attacks that circumvented some prior defense, without considering
how to change it to target the new defense. We suspect that this shortcoming might have been
caused, in part, by the fact that prior work on circumventing defenses typically shows only the final,
successful attack, without describing the methodology that was used to come up with this attack
and thus leaving open questions such as “How was the attack discovered?” or “What other attacks
were unsuccessful?”.
To remedy this problem, instead of merely demonstrating that the thirteen defenses we studied
can be circumvented by stronger attacks, we actually walk the reader through our full process of
analyzing each defense, from an initial paper read-through, to our hypotheses about what would
be required for the defense to be circumvented, to an ultimately successful attack. This approach
lets us more clearly document the many steps involved in developing a strong adaptive attack.
The goal of our analyzes is not to reduce analyzed model’s accuracy all the way to 0%. 2
Instead, we want to demonstrate that the existing adaptive attack evaluation methodology has
shortcomings, and that stronger adaptive attacks can (at least partially) degrade each defense’s
accuracy from what is reported in the original evaluations.
After describing our methodology (Section 3) and providing an overview of common themes
distilled from our evaluations (Section 4), each subsequent section of this paper is dedicated exclu-
sively to the full evaluation of one defense. We state and test our initial hypotheses—gathered from
reading the paper and source code—as to why the original evaluation may have been insufficient.
Finally, we describe how the observations made throughout our evaluation inform the design of a
final adaptive attack that succeeds in circumventing the defense.
1There is a similarly positive trend in terms of releasing source code for defenses. In particular, every defense we
analyzed either released source code, or made it available upon request.
2That said, most of the defenses we study are ineffective at increasing robustness even partially, and we are able
to reduce the accuracy of the defended classifier to the accuracy of a baseline model.
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An overarching theme of our analyzes is simplicity. Attacks need not be complicated—even
if the considered defense is. There are often only a small number of important components in
complex defenses—carefully targeting these can lead to both simpler and stronger attacks. We
design our loss functions, the cornerstone of successful attacks, so that they are easy to optimize
and also consistent—so that higher loss values result in strictly stronger attacks. While some of
our attack strategies are generalizable, no single strategy would have been sufficient for all defenses.
This underlines the crucial fact that adaptive attacks cannot be automated and always require
appropriate tuning to a given defense.
2 Background
This paper studies the robustness of defenses to adversarial examples. Readers familiar with the
relevant literature and notation (Szegedy et al., 2014; Carlini & Wagner, 2017b; Madry et al., 2017;
Athalye et al., 2018a) can continue with Section 3 where we describe our methodology.
For a classification neural network f and a natural input x (e.g., drawn from the test set) with
a true label y, an adversarial example (Szegedy et al., 2014) is a perturbed input x′ such that: (1)
‖x′−x‖ is small, for some distance function3 ‖·‖ but (2) it is classified incorrectly either untargeted,
so that f(x′) 6= y, or targeted, so that f(x′) = t for some selected class t 6= y.4
To generate an adversarial example, we construct a loss function L so that L(x, y) is large when
f(x) 6= y, and then maximize L(x′, y) while keeping the perturbation ‖x − x′‖ small. Defining an
appropriate loss function L is the key component of any adaptive attack. The typical starting-point
for any loss function is the cross-entropy loss LCE .
While there are many methods for generating adversarial examples, the most widely adopted
approach is gradient descent on input space (Carlini & Wagner, 2017b; Madry et al., 2017). Let
x0 = x and then repeatedly set
xi+1 = Proj(xi + α · normalize(∇xiL(xi, y)))
where Proj projects the inputs onto a smaller domain to keep the distortion small, normalize
enforces a unit-length step size under the considered norm, and α controls the size of steps that
are taken. After N steps (e.g., 1000), we let x′ = xN be the resulting adversarial example. Further
background on common adversarial examples generation techniques is provided in Section 2.1.
In some cases, it will be useful to represent the classifier in the form f(x) = arg max z(x), where
z(x) is a vector of class-scores which we refer to as the classifier’s logit layer (e.g., before any softmax
activation function); thus, z(x)i corresponds to the logit value for class i on input x. Through a
slight abuse of notation, we sometimes use f(x) to refer to either the classifier’s output class (i.e.,
f(x) = y) or to the full vector of class probabilities (i.e., f(x) = [p1, . . . , pK ]). The choice should
be clear from context.
3We evaluate each defense under the threat model for which robustness was claimed; in all cases `p norms for
various p ≥ 0.
4Most papers evaluate on whichever result is stronger: thus, papers that propose attacks perform targeted attacks
(because if a targeted attack succeeds, then so will untargeted attacks) and papers that propose defenses perform
untargeted attacks (because a model robust to untargeted attacks is also robust to targeted attacks). We intend for
this paper to be a study in how to perform adaptive attacks evaluations; as such, we choose the untargeted attack
objective that future defense creators will typically choose.
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2.1 Background on Procedures for Generating Adversarial Examples
This section provides some additional background on common attack strategies used in defense
evaluations.
PGD. Projected Gradient Descent (Madry et al., 2017) is a strategy for finding an adversarial
example x′ for an input x that satisfies a given norm-bound ‖x′ − x‖p ≤ .
Let B denote the `p-ball of radius  centered at x. The attack starts at a random point x0 ∈ B,
and repeatedly sets
xi+1 = ProjB(xi + α · g)
for g = arg max
‖v‖p≤1
v>∇xiL(xi, y) .
Here, L(x, y) is a suitable loss-function (e.g., cross-entropy), α is a step-size, ProjB projects an
input onto the norm-ball B, and g is the steepest ascent direction for a given `p-norm. E.g., for the
`∞-norm, Proj(z) is a clipping operator and g = sign(∇xiL(xi, y)) .
C&W. Carlini & Wagner (2017b) propose a number of attacks commonly referred to as C&W
attacks. Instead of maximizing a loss function L(x, y) under a given perturbation constraint (as is
done with PGD above), these attacks aim to find the smallest successful adversarial perturbation.
That is, the attack maximizes the following objective:
maximizex′ L(x′, y)− λ · ‖x′ − x‖p .
The parameter λ > 0 balances the objectives of maximizing the loss and minimizing the perturbation
size. A binary-search over λ is used to find the minimally perturbed x′ that results in a successful
attack.
BPDA. The Backward Pass Differentiable Approximation (BPDA) is a gradient approximation
technique introduced by Athalye et al. (2018a). It is suited for defenses that have one or more
non-differentiable components.
Let f be a n-layer network f(x) = fn◦fn−1◦· · ·◦f1(x) where layer f i(·) is non-differentiable (or
hard to differentiate). To approximate the gradient ∇xf(x), we first find a differentiable function
g(x) such that g(x) ≈ f i(x). Then, when computing the gradient ∇xf(x) via backpropagation,
we compute a standard forward pass through f(·) (including the forward pass through f i(·)), but
replace f i(·) by g(·) on the backward pass.
The approximated gradient can then be plugged into a standard gradient-based attack. For
defenses that apply some type of non-differentiable “de-noising” layer f1(x) to the input, it is often
effective to approximate f1(x) with the identity function g(x) = x.
EOT. Expectation over Transformation (Athalye et al., 2018b) is a standard technique for com-
puting gradients of models with randomized components. The attack was originally proposed for
situations where a randomized transformation is applied to an input x before being fed into a
classifier. The idea is more generally applicable for obtaining gradients of the expectation of any
randomized function.
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Given a randomized classifier fr(x) (where r denotes the classifier’s internal randomness), we
can compute
∇xEr[fr(x)] = Er[∇xfr(x)] ≈ 1
n
n∑
i=1
∇xfri(x) ,
where the ri are independent draws of the function’s randomness. As with BPDA, the approximated
gradients can then be plugged into any standard attack.
3 Methodology
The core of this paper documents the attacks we develop on the thirteen defenses. Our structure
for each defense section is as follows:
• How the defense works. We begin with a brief description of the defense and introduce the
necessary components. We encourage readers to pause after this section to reflect on how one
might attack the described defense before reading our method.5
• Why we selected this defense. While we study many defenses in this paper, we cannot
hope to evaluate all defenses published in the last several years. We selected each defense with
two criteria: (1) it had been accepted at ICLR, ICML, or NeurIPS; indicating that independent
reviewers considered it interesting and sound, and (2) it clearly illustrates some concept; if two
defenses were built on the same idea or we believed would fail in identical situations we selected
only one.6
• Initial hypotheses and experiments. We start by reading each paper with a focus towards
finding potential reasons why the defense might still be vulnerable to adversarial examples, in
spite of the robustness evaluation initially performed in the paper. In order to develop additional
attack hypotheses, we also studied the source code of the defense—which was available publicly
or upon request for all defenses.
• Final robustness evaluation. Given our candidate hypotheses of why the defense could fail,
we turn to developing our own adaptive attacks. In most cases, this consists of (1) constructing
an improved loss function where gradient descent could succeed at generating adversarial ex-
amples, (2) choosing a method of minimizing that loss function, and (3) repeating these steps
based on new insights gleaned from an attack attempt.
• Lessons learned. Having circumvented the defense, we look back and ask what we have
learned from this attack and how it may apply in the future.
The flow of each section directly mirrors the steps we actually took to evaluate the robustness of
the defense, without retroactively drawing conclusions on how we wish we had discovered the flaws.
We hope that this will allow our evaluation strategy to serve as a case study for how to perform
future evaluations from start to finish, rather than just observing the end result.
5To facilitate the reading of this tutorial, we use the standard notation defined in Section 2 to describe each
defense and attack. Each section introduces additional defense-specific notation only if needed. Our notation thus
often differs slightly from that used in each defense’s original paper.
6We discovered a posteriori that some of the selected defenses can fail in similar ways. This report contains our
evaluations for all of our initially selected defenses. In particular, we did not cherry-pick the defense evaluations to
present based on the results of our evaluation.
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Evaluation Themes
Defense T1 T2 T3 T4 T5 T6
Section 5 k-Winners Take All (Xiao et al., 2020)    
Section 6 The Odds are Odd (Roth et al., 2019)   
Section 7 Generative Classifiers (Li et al., 2019)   
Section 8 Sparse Fourier Transform (Bafna et al., 2018)   
Section 9 Rethinking Cross Entropy (Pang et al., 2020a)   
Section 10 Error Correcting Codes (Verma & Swami, 2019)   
Section 11 Ensemble Diversity (Pang et al., 2019)  
Section 12 EMPIR (Sen et al., 2020)   
Section 13 Temporal Dependency (Yang et al., 2019b)     
Section 14 Mixup Inference (Pang et al., 2020b)  
Section 15 ME-Net (Yang et al., 2019a)     
Section 16 Asymmetrical Adv. Training (Yin et al., 2020)    
Section 17 Weakness into a Strength (Hu et al., 2019)     
Table 1: The themes illustrated by each defense we break.
We emphasize that our main goal is to assess whether each defense’s initial robustness evaluation
was appropriate, and—if we find it was not—to demonstrate how to build a stronger adaptive attack
on that defense. Importantly, we do not wish to claim that the robustness techniques used by many
of these defenses hold no merit whatsoever. It may well be that some instantiations of these
techniques can improve model robustness. To convincingly make such a claim however, a defense
has to be backed up by a strong adaptive evaluation—the focal point of our tutorial.
4 Recurring Attack Themes
We identify six themes (and one meta-theme) that are common to multiple evaluations. We discuss
each below. Table 1 gives an overview of the themes that relate to each of the defenses we studied.
(meta-theme) T0: Strive for simplicity. Our adaptive attacks are consistently simpler than
the adaptive attacks attempted in each paper. In all cases, our attack is as close as possible to
straightforward gradient descent with an appropriate loss function; we add additional complexity
only when simpler attacks fail. It is easier to diagnose failures of simpler attacks, in order to iterate
towards a stronger attack. The themes below mainly relate to various ways in which an attack can
be made simpler, yet stronger.
T1: Attack (a function close to) the full defense. When a defense is end-to-end differ-
entiable, the entire defense should be attacked. Adding any additional losses should be avoided
unless they are necessary; conversely, any components, especially pre-processing functions, should
be included if at all possible.
T2: Identify and target important defense parts. Some defenses combine many sub-
components in a complex fashion. Often, inspecting these components reveals that only one or
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two would be sufficient for the defense to fail. Targeting only these components can lead to attacks
that are simpler, stronger, and easier to optimize.
T3: Adapt the objective to simplify the attack. There are many objective functions that
can be optimized to generate adversarial examples. Choosing the “best” one is not trivial but can
vastly boost an attack’s success rate. For example, we find that targeted attacks (or “multi-targeted
attacks” (Gowal et al., 2019)) are sometimes easier to formulate than untargeted attacks. We also
show that feature adversaries (Sabour et al., 2016) are an effective way to circumvent many defenses
that detect adversarial examples. Here, we pick a natural input x∗ from another class than x and
generate an adversarial example x′ that matches the feature space of x∗ at some inner layer.
T4: Ensure the loss function is consistent. Prior work has shown that many defense evalu-
ations fail because of loss functions that are hard to optimize (Carlini & Wagner, 2017b; Athalye
et al., 2018a). We find that many defense evaluations suffer from an orthogonal and deeper issue:
the chosen loss function is not actually a good proxy for attack success. That is, even with an
all-powerful optimizer that is guaranteed to find the loss’ optimum, an attack may fail. Such loss
functions are not consistent.
T5: Optimize the loss function with different methods. Given a useful loss function that is
as simple as possible, one should choose the appropriate attack algorithm as well as the right hyper-
parameters (e.g. sufficiently many iterations or repetitions). In particular, a white-box gradient-
based attack is not always the most appropriate algorithm for optimizing the loss function. In
some cases, we find that applying a “black-box” score-based attack (Chen et al., 2017; Ilyas et al.,
2018) or decision-based attack (Brendel et al., 2018) can optimize loss functions that are difficult
to differentiate.
T6: Use a strong adaptive attack for adversarial training. Many papers argue that com-
bining their proposed defense with adversarial training (Szegedy et al., 2014; Madry et al., 2017)
results in a more robust defense than either technique individually. Yet, we find that many such
combined defenses result in lower robustness than adversarial training on its own. This illustrates
a second failure mode of weak adaptive attacks: if the attack used for training fails to reliably find
adversarial examples for the defense, the trained model will not resist stronger attacks.
5 k-Winners Take All
This paper (Xiao et al., 2020) proposes an activation function that is intentionally designed to mask
backpropagating gradients in order to defend against gradient-based attacks.
5.1 How The Defense Works
This defense replaces the standard ReLU activation function in a deep neural network with a
discontinuous k-Winners-Take-All (k-WTA) function,
φk(y)j =
{
yj , yj ∈ {k largest elements of y} ,
0, else.
8
The activation function is applied to the output of a whole layer. The parameter k is typically not
the same for all layers. Instead, for each layer k is obtained by multiplying the dimensionality N
of the layer’s output with a constant sparsity factor γ ∈ [0, 1].
The result of this particular choice of activation function is that even small changes to the
input drastically change the activation patterns in the network and thus lead to large jumps in
the predictions. This behavior is highlighted in the manuscript (Xiao et al., 2020, Figure 5). This
chaotic partitioning of the activation patterns destroys all useful gradient information and thus
prevents gradient-based attacks from finding minimal adversarial examples.
Why we selected this defense. There are many defenses that unintentionally make gradient
descent hard. This paper takes that to the extreme and designs the defense with a “C0 discontinuous
function that purposely invalidates the neural network model’s gradient” (Xiao et al., 2020). Because
prior work has argued that this form of gradient masking is a fundamental flaw (Athalye et al.,
2018a), the existence of such a defense would go against common wisdom.
5.2 Initial Hypotheses and Experiments
The implicit assumption of the paper is that gradient-based attacks are strictly stronger than black-
box attacks such as score-based or decision-based attacks (Chen et al., 2017; Brendel et al., 2018).
There are many classes of functions for which this is not true. For example, consider any undefended
network and add a simple non-differentiable activation function to the final logits that quantizes
them extremely finely. Then, naïve gradient-based attacks would fail because all gradients would
be zero or undefined. However, estimating the gradient from finite differences would still work.7
In order to demonstrate that the defense is effective, the paper tests against transfer-based
attacks. While it argues that “generating adversarial examples from an independently trained copy
of the target network” is “the strongest black-box attack”, in practice transfer attacks are often
weak. The success of transfer attacks strongly depends on how close the substitute model is to the
target model. Training with the same architecture is insufficient; networks trained from different
initializations can be far apart in their internal representations. The perturbation size necessary for
transfer attacks to succeed is thus often significantly larger than for white-box attacks (Papernot
et al., 2016b; Tramèr et al., 2018). One setting where transfer-based attacks can be strong is if
the model f can be transformed into a nearly identical model f ′ for which it is easier to generate
adversarial examples (e.g., the BPDA attack of Athalye et al. (2018a) can be seen as an instance of
this approach). In contrast, even the most restricted class of direct attacks, decision-based attacks
(which only use the final label decision of the model (Brendel et al., 2018)), can perform as well as
gradient-based attacks if the attack is run until convergence.
While the omission of score- and decision-based attacks is the biggest concern, a few other issues
make it difficult to assess the true robustness of this defense from the initial evaluation. First, the
lack of a distortion-accuracy plot makes it difficult to spot gradient-masking issues (Carlini et al.,
2019). Second, some attacks (C&W, DeepFool) are actually optimizing the `2 metric and not the
`∞ metric under which the accuracy is measured, meaning that the values for those attacks should
be much higher than for proper `∞ attacks (but they are often close, within a few percentage
7Note that an adaptive attacker could just remove such a non-differentiable layer and then succeed. While such
a defense may sound implausible, Section 10 evaluates exactly such a defense that unintentionally post-processes
with the “identity” function g(y) = log(exp(y)) which, while mathematically a no-op, causes numerically unstable
gradients. Removing this post-processing function breaks the defense.
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Figure 1: Loss landscape of the k-Winners Take All defense. The plot shows the difference between
the logit of the ground-truth class and the next highest logit along a random perturbation direction
x+  sign(δ). Note the x-axis scale: the largest perturbation changes the input by 0.1%.
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points). Finally, the attacks in the paper are only applied with a small number of steps (20-40),
which might have prevented attacks from converging, and without any repetitions (which can often
reduce accuracy by 10% or more).
For our experiments, we evaluate the authors’ released defense on CIFAR-10 with `∞ bounded
attacks of distortion  = 8/255. We evaluate k-WTA at sparsity ratio γ = 0.1 as the paper
reports the strongest results with this setting. We evaluate both a vanilla and an adversarially
trained ResNet-18 for which the paper claims 13.1% and 50.0% accuracy (respectively). All our
experiments rely on implementations in Foolbox (Rauber et al., 2017).
We begin our evaluation by running a standard PGD attack (Madry et al., 2017), with 400 steps
instead of 40 as performed in the paper’s original evaluation. We find that over the progression
of the attack, the cross-entropy loss exhibits high fluctuations. In fact, adversarial examples were
seemingly found by chance and the attack did not reliably decrease the average loss. This suggests
that the extreme jagged loss surface of the k-WTA-model could even decrease the accuracy compared
to a baseline model: because of the high fluctuations in the logits, it is possible that even in correct
and high-confidence regions of the original model, the fluctuations in the logits could introduce
adversarial examples.
We then looked at the loss function close to clean samples. As is visible in Figure 1, even very
small perturbations can flip the loss to a new state. The loss stays roughly constant until it flips
again if the perturbation is further increased. This explains why standard gradient-based attacks
fail: the gradients can only highlight the direction of descent on each plateau but cannot take into
account the substantial non-linear activation shifts at the boundary of the plateaus. In other words,
the gradients are only valid in an extremely small and confined region but are not representative of
the descent directions over larger regions. Section 9 contains another defense that fails for a similar
reason.
We therefore hypothesize that a strong black-box attack that directly queries the target model
and estimates the gradients from finite differences over a larger space would be an effective attack
on this defense.
5.3 Final Robustness Evaluation
Our final attack strategy was to average out the randomness by estimating the average local gradient
δ at point x with M = 20000 random perturbations drawn from a standard normal distribution
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with standard deviation  = 8/255, i.e.,
g(x) =
2
σM
M/2∑
j=0
[∇xLCE(f(x+ δ), y) +∇xLCE(f(x− δ), y)]
where δ ∼ N (µ = 0, σ2) and LCE is the cross-entropy loss. We run this attack for 100 steps and
successfully generated adversarial examples for both the vanilla as well as the adversarially trained
ResNet-18 that reach 0% and 0.16% accuracy respectively.
Observe that this confirms our concerns: not only is k-WTA not an effective defense, it makes
adversarial training worse. This is not the first time that this has happened: Athalye et al. (2018a)
previously observed the same effect of a defense reducing the efficacy of adversarial training.
Lessons Learned.
1. Score-based or decision-based attacks can work as well or even better than gradient-based at-
tacks, in particular when the gradients are (intentionally) masked.
2. Transfer-based attacks, while cheap to implement, require a highly similar source model. The
best transfer attacks typically succeed less than half of the time, and thus transfer attacks
typically cannot disprove robustness claims less than roughly 50%.
Exercises for the reader.
1. Instead of performing a black-box attack, is there a smooth and differentiable approximation of
k-WTA that allows direct gradient descent to succeed?
2. Increasing the sparsity ratio γ reduces the fluctuations in the network activations. Is it possible
to transfer adversarial examples from a less-sparse model to the sparser model, analogous to a
prior attack on Stochastic Activation Pruning (Dhillon et al., 2018; Athalye et al., 2018a)?
6 The Odds are Odd
This paper (Roth et al., 2019) proposes a statistical test for detecting adversarial examples, based
on the distribution of a classifier’s logit values (i.e., the per-class scores in the last layer of the
classifier, before the softmax computation).
6.1 How The Defense Works
The main assumption that motivates the paper’s defense is that adversarial examples are less robust
to noise than benign examples. More specifically, for a given input x, the defense compares the
“clean” logit vector z(x) to a “noisy” logit vector z(x + δ), where δ ∼ N is sampled at test-time
from some fixed distribution N (e.g., a multinomial Gaussian). The assumption is that for clean
examples, z(x) ≈ z(x+δ), while for adversarial examples the two logit vectors will differ significantly.
In more detail, the defense looks at variations in the difference between the logit of the predicted
class y and the logits of other classes i 6= y. Let
∆y,i(x) = z(x)i − z(x)y ,
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where y is the predicted class, i 6= y is some other class, and z(x)j is the logit for class j. Note
that ∆y,i(x) is always negative. For each class, the defense checks whether these logit differences
are robust to noise by computing8
∆¯y,i(x) = Eδ∼N [∆y,i(x+ δ)−∆y,i(x)] .
In practice, the expectation is approximated by sampling k independent noise values δ ∼ N . An
input is rejected as adversarial if for any class i other than the predicted class y = f(x), we have
∆¯y,i(x) > τy,i, where the τy,i are thresholds set to achieve some fixed false-positive rate.
Why we selected this defense. The approach taken by this defense is very simple, but relies on
a common misconception that the peculiarities of adversarial examples created by standard attacks
can be used to detect all adversarial examples. This defense is very similar in spirit to the one
analyzed in Section 17.9
6.2 Initial Hypotheses and Experiments
The paper’s evaluation shows that existing attacks such as PGD (Madry et al., 2017) or C&W (Car-
lini & Wagner, 2017b) indeed produce adversarial examples with large values of ∆¯y,i(x). Due to
the stochastic nature of the defense, the defense is further evaluated on an attack that combines
PGD with “Expectation Over Transformation” (EOT) (Athalye et al., 2018b) to produce adversarial
examples robust to noise from N .10 While more effective, this attack’s success rate remains low.
The paper’s evaluation shows no clear “red-flags”, in part because very few results beyond the
absolute detection numbers are reported (which perhaps could be considered a red-flag: it is helpful
for defenses to give additional statistics if only to diagnose potential errors).
To better understand why existing attacks fail, and what a successful attack would have to
achieve, we take a closer look at the detection statistics computed by the defense:
∆¯y,i(x) = Eδ∼N [∆y,i(x+ δ)−∆y,i(x)]
= Eδ∼N [(z(x+ δ)i − z(x+ δ)y)− (z(x)i − z(x)y)]
= Eδ∼N [(z(x+ δ)i − z(x+ δ)y)]︸ ︷︷ ︸
s1
+ (z(x)y − z(x)i)︸ ︷︷ ︸
s2
.
We focus on the scores s1 and s2 independently. Observe that s1 + s2 must be small to evade the
defense.
The term s1 is positive and large if the model often switches its prediction to some other class
when the input is perturbed with noise. The term s2 is positive and large if the model is overly
confident in its original prediction of class y, compared to other classes i 6= y.
From here, we notice an issue with the type of attacks evaluated in the paper. PGD creates
examples with abnormally large values of s2 (compared to benign examples) as this is precisely
the objective that the attack maximizes. In contrast, attacks such as C&W that find the smallest
adversarial perturbation will find examples that lie very close to the decision boundary. For these,
8The values ∆¯y,i(x) are further normalized using means and standard deviations computed on the training set.
This step is unimportant to understand the defense and our attacks.
9We break the defense in Section 17 with a single-purpose attack that is not as generalizable as the one described
in this section, but which demonstrates the wide space of adaptive attacks.
10A description of each of these attack techniques is in Section 2.1.
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s2 will be small, but s1 will be large as examples close to the boundary are typically not robust to
noise. Finally, combining PGD with EOT will reduce the term s1, but will not prevent the attack
from finding examples with abnormally large values of s2.
Thus, a successful attack will be one that finds adversarial examples for which: (1) the model’s
robustness to noise is no smaller than for an average benign example; and (2) the model’s confidence
is no larger than for an average benign example. Interestingly, for a logistic regression model
these two properties of resistance to noise and model confidence are directly related: the model’s
confidence depends on an input’s distance to the decision boundary, which in turn defines the
input’s robustness to (Gaussian) noise.
6.3 Final Robustness Evaluation
We perform our evaluation on CIFAR-10, using the code released by the authors. We consider
`∞ attacks bounded by  = 8/255, for which the paper claims a 71.4% detection rate with a
standard wide ResNet architecture. We consider two default settings proposed by the authors, one
where the noise δ is sampled from a single multinomial Gaussian, and one where the terms ∆¯y,i(x)
are computed for 10 different sources of noise (Gaussian and uniform distributions with different
variances). In the latter case, inference is extremely expensive: classifying a single example x
requires computing z(x+ δ) for thousands of noise values δ.
As a first attack strategy, we create adversarial examples for which the term s2 is the same order
of magnitude as for benign samples. To do this we generate an adversarial example that targets the
logits of an arbitrary benign example from another class. This is a “feature-level” attack (Sabour
et al., 2016), where we aim to match the model’s internal representation of another class, rather
than just changing the predicted output. For each class t, we pick a benign example xt of that class
and compute the logits z(xt). Then, for an example x of class y, we pick a target t 6= y and use
PGD to create adversarial examples x′ that minimize the objective:
||z(x′)− z(xt)||22 . (1)
This attack is surprisingly effective. The attack always fools the classifier, and only a small number
of adversarial examples are detected due to abnormally large values ∆¯y,i(x). For the defense that
uses a single noise source, 17% of attacks are detected. For the defense that combines 10 noise
sources (and therefore needs to lower the thresholds τy,i to achieve a fixed false-positive rate), only
10% of attacks are detected.
To increase the attack strength, we further add the s1 term to our objective. To minimize
s1, we apply standard EOT. Crucially, we apply EOT to the logit-matching objective in equa-
tion (1), rather than to the standard PGD objective. The resulting attack always fools the classifier
maintaining a 0% detection rate; lower than the false positive rate.
Lessons Learned.
1. Most existing attacks produce adversarial examples that are either abnormally close to the
decision boundary (e.g., C&W), or have abnormally high confidence (e.g., PGD). While this
makes these attacks easy to detect, an adaptive attack can create examples that are similarly
close to boundaries and have similar confidence as benign examples.
2. This defense serves as a canonical example of the power of a very simple “logit-matching” attack
that is effective against multiple defenses.
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Algorithm 1 Generative Classifier (Li et al., 2019).
Input: Data point x
Output: Logits z(x)
for k ∈ [1,K] do // iterate over class labels
~µ, ~σ = enc(x, k) // class-conditional encoder
for i ∈ [1, N ] do
η ← N (~µ, ~σ · I) // sample latent vector
x∗ = dec1(η) // decode to input
y∗ = dec2(η) // decode to logits
Lrecons = ||x− x∗||22 // input loss
LCE = cross-entropy(y∗, k) // label loss
pprior = log(N (η; 0, I)) // log prior
pposterior = log(N (η; ~µ, ~σ · I)) // log posterior
scorei = −Lrecons − LCE + pprior − pposterior
end
lk = log
(
1
N
∑N
i=1 exp(scorei)
)
// logit
end
return z(x) = [l1, . . . , lK ]
3. When attacking a randomized defense, expectation-over-transformation (EOT) is an insufficient
strategy if the attack objective is not also appropriately adapted.
Exercises for the reader. It has been shown that for adversarially trained models, it is hard to
perturb examples so as to match the logit representation of an example from a different class (En-
gstrom et al., 2019). Thus, the above logit-matching attack will probably not be effective if the
defense is instantiated with a robust classifier. This leads to the following questions:
1. How effective is this paper’s detection mechanism when instantiated with a robust classifier?
2. Is there a better adaptive attack for this combined defense, for example by more directly incor-
porating the term s2 into the attack objective?
7 Are Generative Classifiers More Robust?
This defense (Li et al., 2019) is fairly complex and displays many characteristics of what makes an
evaluation challenging, such as the use of multiple models, aggregation of multiple losses, stochas-
ticity, and an extra detection step.
7.1 How The Defense Works
The defense is based on the Variational Auto-Encoder framework (Kingma &Welling, 2014). Specif-
ically, the authors assume that data points (x, y) are generated by some unknown process involving
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an unobserved latent variable η.11 The paper explores different ways of factoring the joint distri-
bution p(x, y, η). We focus on the “GBZ” model that the authors found to be most robust (see (Li
et al., 2019) for a graphical illustration):
p(x, y, η) = p(η)p(y|η)p(x|η) .
Rather than delving into the theory of Variational Auto-Encoders, we present here the high-level
classification algorithm implemented in the source code released by the authors (see Algorithm 1).
This mirrors our own mental model when assessing the robustness of this defense: understanding and
evaluating what the implementation does is often more useful than understanding the theoretical
or intuitive explanations made in the paper.
The classifier combines three models, a per-class encoder enc that produces parameters for
sampling random latent vectors η, and two decoders dec1, dec2 that reconstruct the input and
label from the latent vectors. All these models use standard CNN architectures. For each class, the
defense runs these three models for N random latent vectors (N = 10 by default), and computes
four scores that combine to form the logit for that class.
The paper proposes two extensions. First, to scale to CIFAR-10, the input x is fed into a feature-
extractor φ = Φ(x), where Φ is an intermediate layer of a pre-trained VGG classifier. Second, the
paper adds a detection step, that rejects inputs with “unusual” class probabilities f(x) (obtained
by applying the softmax function to the logits z(x)). We focus on the best-performing approach,
where the detector rejects inputs with high KL-divergence between f(x) and the mean probability
vectors from training inputs of the same class.
Why we selected this defense. The defense relies on a generative approach which has often
been postulated as being more robust than purely discriminative models. This defense’s complexity
makes it particularly hard to evaluate and illustrates the advantage of focusing on simple attacks
that precisely target the defense’s most important pieces.
7.2 Initial Hypotheses and Experiments
Our initial observation is simply that this defense is complex 12 (see Section 10 for another complex
defense). It involves three networks, four scoring terms, many mixes of exponentials and logarithms,
heavy randomization, and a detection step. It thus comes at little surprise that existing attacks
(e.g., PGD (Madry et al., 2017) or C&W (Carlini & Wagner, 2017b)) are shown to be ineffective
in the paper: combining multiple loss terms effectively is never easy. The evaluation explicitly
demonstrates the insufficiency of these attacks: attacks with unreasonably large `∞-bounds ( = 0.5
on MNIST, and  = 25/255 on CIFAR-10) fail to bring the classifier’s accuracy to 0%.
We set out to test the following initial hypotheses, informed by our reading of the paper and of
the released code:
1. It is unlikely that the four terms that make up scorei are all of similar importance. Targeting
a single one might be sufficient and easier to optimize.
11Our notation differs slightly from that in the paper, which denotes the latent variable by z, because we use z for
the logit vector.
12Deep generative models tend to be much more complex than standard discriminative models, so the complexity
of this defense is not unwarranted. But this does make a strong adaptive evaluation challenging.
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2. Given a successful attack on the classifier, it is plausible that only slight tweaks to the distri-
bution of the logits z(x) will be needed to also fool the detector.
We evaluate the paper’s MNIST and CIFAR-10 models, using code and models provided by the
authors. For simplicity, we exclusively consider a standard `∞ threat-model with  = 0.3 on MNIST
and  = 8/255 on CIFAR-10 (the paper also gives results for other bounds and for `2 attacks).
After a few standard yet ineffective tests (increasing PGD iterations and the number of random
samples N), we tried a simple attack using random perturbations and many restarts. This attack
was surprisingly effective: after a few thousand trials the MNIST model’s accuracy dropped below
50%. While trying to build a stronger attack (see details below), we noticed a curious fact about
this defense: the success of our random attack is not due to the model’s lack of noise-robustness,
but to the high variance in the model’s estimate of the scorei values. Indeed, even when classifying
an unperturbed input drawn from the test set multiple times in a row, the model misclassifies it
with some small (5%-10%) probability. The defense is thus vulnerable to a “trivial” attack that
continuously submits the same input until the model misclassifies it by chance. This can be fixed
by increasing the number N of sampled latent vectors, at a cost of more expensive inference.
We thus searched for an attack that could produce more “robust” adversarial examples. To test
our first hypothesis, we compared the different terms in the scores scorey and scorei, where y is
the true class and i 6= y some other class. We found that LCE is the only important term. The
other terms vary little across class scores. With a standard PGD attack to maximize the LCE term
for the true class, we reduce the classifier’s accuracy below 5% on both MNIST and CIFAR-10.
These adversarial examples are also robust to the model’s high variance.
We found that despite only targeting the classifier, this attack is moderately successful against
the KL-divergence detector: only 20% of the MNIST attacks and 10% of the CIFAR-10 attacks
are detected. This gives credence to our second hypothesis. Finally, we proceed to find adaptive
strategies that fool both the classifier and detector.
7.3 Final Robustness Evaluation
We first directly minimized the KL-divergence, which proved computationally expensive (as it
requires optimizing over all class scores) and unsuccessful. We further tried to align the model’s
decoded logits y∗ = dec2(η) to those produced on a clean input from a different class, using the
“feature-adversary” (Sabour et al., 2016). The aim is to match the model’s internal representations
to those obtained with another input, so that downstream statistics (e.g., the softmax output)
match as well. On CIFAR-10, this attack achieves 99% success against the combined classifier and
detector.
The insight of feature adversaries suggests a much simpler attack we had overlooked. As the
CIFAR-10 classifier is of the form f(Φ(x)) where Φ(x) are features extracted from a VGG model, an
attack that transforms these features to those of a different class will be successful. Concretely, we
find an adversarial example x′ that minimizes L(x′) = ||Φ(x′)−Φ(xt)||22, where Φ(xt) are the VGG
features for a clean example xt of a different class. This attack succeeds with 100% probability.
For the MNIST classifier, the same attacks as above produce adversarial examples that each
succeed with 90% probability (over the model’s internal randomness). This limitation may be
inherent as the model also has a 10% failure rate when classifying a clean input. To verify that our
attack’s “failure” is indeed due to the classifier’s excessive variance, we made the sampling of latent
vectors η deterministic (i.e., given parameters ~µ, ~σ, the samples η1, . . . , ηN are produced using a
fixed seed). In this simplified setting (which has no effect on the model’s accuracy), we reach 100%
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success rate with the following PGD attack: we maximize LCE for the true class, and stop as soon
as we find that the perturbation computed by the current PGD iteration also fools the detector.
Lessons Learned.
1. For complex defenses, it is useful to decompose the contributions of individual classification
steps, in order to determine which ones should be focused on.
2. Evaluating a defense on random noise can reveal surprising failure cases.
3. Feature adversaries are useful for jointly evading a classifier and detector, as they ensure that
any statistics computed on top of adversarial features match those from clean examples.
Exercises for the reader.
1. Do there exist more robust adversarial examples on the MNIST classifier, that succeed with
probability close to 100% over the classifier’s randomness?
2. Do some of the attacks described above translate to other generative classifiers (Schott et al.,
2019a; Willetts et al., 2019)?
8 Robust Sparse Fourier Transform
This paper (Bafna et al., 2018) introduces a defense to `0 adversarial examples through what is
called a “robust sparse Fourier transform”.
8.1 How The Defense Works
For a given input, this paper proposes to defend against `0 adversarial examples by taking each
image, “compressing” it by projecting to the top-k coefficients of the discrete cosine transform,
inverting that to recover an approximate image, and then classifying the recovered image. The
classifier is trained on images compressed in this way so that it remains accurate.
In more detail, this paper uses the Iterative Hard Thresholding (IHT) method which consists of
T iterations, each of which performs a pass at compressing the input x with a Fourier transform and
then recovering the inverted input. This defense’s idea is conceptually similar to that of the ME-Net
defense studied in Section 15, although ME-Net has the additional challenge of being randomized.
Why we selected this defense. There are not many defenses to `0 adversarial examples, and
applying a Fourier transform intuitively makes sense as a possible defense.
8.2 Initial Hypotheses and Experiments
This paper does not contain an analysis of its robustness to adaptive attacks. Instead, it demon-
strates that adversarial examples on a base classifier, when pre-processed by the defense method,
are no longer classified as adversarial by the base classifier afterwards. This is insufficient to demon-
strate robustness as has been argued extensively (Carlini et al., 2019).
In particular, the paper claims over 75% accuracy at an `0 robustness of 55 on MNIST; however,
it has been shown that an `0 distortion of 25 is sufficient to actually cause humans to change their
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classification of MNIST images (Jacobsen et al., 2019): it is therefore improbable that any defense
could achieve a stronger result.
We suspected that an adaptive attack would break this defense without any other difficulty. The
paper argues robustness on multiple `0 attacks, including the one presented by Carlini & Wagner
(2017b) which often has lower distortion than the others considered. We therefore adapt this attack
to the defense.
8.3 Final Robustness Evaluation
To begin we implement this defense as a differentiable pre-processor in front of the neural network
classifier (using code provided by the authors). Implementing the procedure as a differentiable
function requires a small amount of work as there are no non-differentiable components: everything
is already fully differentiable. We then apply the `0 attack from Carlini & Wagner (2017b) on this
combined function without any further modification. We run the attack with a maximum of 500
iterations of gradient descent before deciding which pixels to freeze at their original value. Instead
of running a multi-targeted attack we run the attack in an untargeted manner, resulting in a larger
distortion than we could otherwise achieve but 10× faster and mirroring the original evaluation. We
find the resulting attack is successful at generating adversarial examples with a median distortion
of 14.8 pixels, within the margin of error of the 15 pixels reported by Carlini & Wagner (2017b) for
an undefended model.
Lessons Learned.
1. It is important to optimize the combined loss function on f(p(x)) whenever defenses propose a
pre-processing function p.
2. Not all pre-processing functions are hard to differentiate. Some just require to be implemented
in a library that supports auto-differentiation.
Exercises for the reader.
1. The pre-processing method is differentiable: at each iteration of the IHT procedure, the inner
computation is a floating point value. Can the defense be broken if we artificially make it
non-differentiable, e.g., by quantizing the output of IHT?
2. To make models robust to `0-attacks, one option is to train a model against `1-attacks (Tramèr
& Boneh, 2019). Is there an approach that is specifically aimed at the `0 norm?
9 Rethinking Softmax Cross Entropy
This paper (Pang et al., 2020a) proposes a new loss function to use during training in order to
increase adversarial robustness.
9.1 How The Defense Works
The paper trains a feature-extractor g. Note that for this classifier, the output features g(x) ∈ RN
do not correspond to class-scores. Instead of training models with standard softmax cross entropy,
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this paper proposes the Max-Mahalanobis center (MMC) loss, defined as
LMMC(g(x), y) =
1
2
‖g(x)− µy‖2 .
Here, the µy ∈ RN are the centroids of the Max-Mahalanobis distribution; the exact choice of µ is
not important for understanding the defense. Given the trained feature-extraction network function
g, the network classifies an input x into one of K classes as
f(x) = arg min1≤i≤K‖g(x)− µi‖2.
We comment on one further observation we make of this paper. While not a failure mode, this
paper contains a large amount of theory and proofs of various facts that are mostly unrelated to
the actual defense proposal itself. While this theory may be interesting in its own right, it is not
always necessary to follow the theory for why the defense was proposed in order to still evaluate
the proposed defense.
Why we selected this defense. There are a number of defenses that aim to replace the standard
softmax cross entropy loss with alternate functions. We select this defense as as a representative
example of this style of defense because it is a strengthening of a prior defense to adversarial
examples (Pang et al., 2018), and as such we expected it would be a strong candidate.
9.2 Initial Hypotheses and Experiments
This defense does not perform an analysis of robustness to adaptive attacks; as such, we expect
that carefully constructing a loss function that is well suited to the defense will allow us to reduce
the accuracy significantly.
In general, whenever a defense changes the loss function used to train a model, our first hy-
pothesis is always that the new model has a loss surface that is not well suited to attacks with the
standard softmax cross entropy loss. Towards that end, we perform the analysis that we would
have liked to see in the original paper.
The original evaluation uses standard attacks such as PGD that maximize the cross-entropy
loss over the model’s predictions. The paper defines the defense’s logit vector z(x) as z(x)i =
−‖g(x) − µi‖2 for 1 ≤ i ≤ K, and then applies the softmax function to z(x) to obtain class
probabilities. Initially we examined the value of the logits of the classifier and found that they were
extremely abnormal compared to a typical classifier. The largest logit tended to be near 0 and the
remaining logits near −200. This reminded us of distillation as a defense (Papernot et al., 2016c),
which has a similar effect on the logits. A simple method for breaking distillation is to simply
divide the logits by a large constant (Carlini & Wagner, 2016); however when we tried this it was
not sufficient to break the defense completely (although it did help some and reduced the classifier
accuracy on CIFAR-10 from 24% to 18%. That this alone allowed the attacks to succeed more often
was worrying: shifting the logits by a constant should not improve the efficacy of attacks.
As such, we hypothesized that an attack would need to design a loss function that better
captured what the defense was doing in order to succeed more often.
9.3 Final Robustness Evaluation
The justification for what the defense does, as well as its training procedure, are complicated. Yet,
inference is simple. Given the trained feature-extraction network function g, the network assigns
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the label
arg mini‖g(x)− µi‖2.
That is, there are K (for a K-class classification problem) different “target” vectors {µi}Ki=1 and
the classifier returns whichever target is closest given the feature vector g(x). In this sense, this
defense is similar to the error correcting defense from Section 10.
This gives us our candidate attack procedure. Instead of indirectly performing softmax cross
entropy loss on the distances to µ, we directly target each of the target vectors µ. That is, we
directly optimize the loss function
L(x) = ‖g(x)− µi‖22
for each target class i, again performing a multi-targeted attack. Directly optimizing the loss
function in this way reduces the classifier accuracy to under 0.5% at distortion  = 0.031 on
CIFAR-10.
Lessons Learned.
1. Any time a defense changes the loss function used during training, the loss function used to
attack should always be studied carefully.
2. The softmax cross-entropy loss is hard to optimize when there are large differences in the model’s
logit values.
Exercises for the reader.
1. The logit margin loss introduced by Carlini & Wagner (2017b) can outperform the cross-entropy
loss for abnormal logit values. Can applying PGD with this loss reduce the defense’s accuracy
towards 0%?
10 Error Correcting Codes
This paper (Verma & Swami, 2019) proposes a method for training an ensemble of models with
sufficient diversity that the redundancy can act as error correcting codes to allow for robust classi-
fication.
10.1 How The Defense Works
Given an K-class classification problem, this paper proposes to generate a matrix A ∈ {0, 1}K×M
of binary codewords.13 The defense trainsM different classifiers so that classifier fi outputs a value
between 0 and 1 with the objective that fi(x) = Aj,i when the label for x is j. This way, each
classifier is performing a binary task prediction where each class is randomly assigned to either the
0 or the 1 class. Clearly if there are not enough classifiers, we can not uniquely recover the result
given the output of the models (in particular, we must at least have that M ≥ log(K)). Thus, each
classifier fi is trained on a slightly different task, aiming to increase diversity of the classifiers so
that adversarial examples will not transfer between the classifiers.
Specifically, each classifier is trained as a function zi : X → R and then fi(x) = sigmoid(zi(x)).
To generate the final predictions, define the vector Z(x) =
[
z1(x) z1(x) . . . zM (x)
]
, and then
return f(x) = arg max1≤j≤K‖sigmoid(Z(x))−Aj‖2.
13The paper generates the matrix A using some procedure that is unimportant for understanding the defense.
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Why we selected this defense. We study this defense, along with the the Ensemble Diversity
(Pang et al., 2019) defense in the prior section, as representative examples of defenses that ensemble
together multiple models. Because the prior defense was not robust, we selected another ensembling
defense to test if it would be any more robust to adversarial examples.
10.2 Initial Hypotheses and Experiments
This is another defense that we would classify as complex, even though it may not look that way
initially. It is not difficult—it is an easy defense to understand, conceptually—but there are several
moving pieces where multiple classifiers are trained independently and each classifier is trained on a
different task. As we saw previously with the generative model defense (Li et al., 2019) in Section 7,
attacks on complex defenses do not have to be complex once the weak links are identified.
Our main concern with this paper was that it reports nearly 40% accuracy at an `∞ distortion
of ε = 0.5 which is a tell-tale sign of gradient masking (Athalye et al., 2018a): any defense at this
distortion must be breaking the gradient descent process somehow. This paper draws exactly the
opposite conclusion from this figure, stating that “Because model accuracy rapidly drops to near 0
as ε grows, the [accuracy versus distortion] figure provides crucial evidence that our approach has
genuine robustness to adversarial attack and is not relying on “gradient-masking”.” While it is true
that the accuracy does go down, it does not reach 0% accuracy at ε = 0.5 and therefore the defense
is causing gradient masking.
When we study the code we find the reason for this. Each of the classifiers fi are followed
by a sigmoid activation function in order to map to the correct output space for the 0-1 codes.
However, after this, to compute the unified predictions, the implementation takes the log of the
result and then feeds this into the softmax function. Finally, to generate adversarial examples with
the cross-entropy loss, another log is required. This is exceptionally numerically unstable and we
suspected it was the cause of the gradient problems.
10.3 Final Robustness Evaluation
Given the M neural networks {fi}Mi=1, we remove the final sigmoid layer after each model, and
remove the log operation in merging together the predictions. In order to be more robust to further
numerical instabilities, we replace the standard softmax cross entropy with the hinge loss proposed
by (Carlini & Wagner, 2017b). This attack is able to substantially degrade the model accuracy to
lower than 20% on CIFAR-10 at ε = 0.031, however it does not completely reduce it to zero.
We then apply a few tricks that are typically able to reduce the accuracy by a few percentage
points more. First, we run a multi-targeted attack and generate untargeted adversarial examples
by targeting each of the other 9 target labels. Second, we run each of these multi-targeted attacks
five times, with different initial random steps for the PGD attack. Finally, if any inner iteration
of PGD succeeds at generating an adversarial example we take this; we don’t require that the final
output of PGD after exactly 100 steps is an adversarial example. This finally brings the accuracy of
the classifier to under 5% at ε = 0.031, compared to the reported 57% accuracy at this distortion.
Lessons Learned.
1. Combining together multiple neural networks into a single combined defended network is
extremely error-prone; however, once a simple method is identified, it often is effective.
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2. There are number of tricks that can increase attack success rate by a few percentage points
each; when model accuracy is already low, these tricks can be sufficient to reduce accuracy to
near-zero.
Exercises for the reader.
1. Suppose that instead of returning the closest code word given the output of the model, the
defense only returned the class if all codeword bits agreed (and rejected the input otherwise).
Clearly this will reduce classifier accuracy—but will it increase robustness?
2. Is there a different loss function for PGD, so that an untargeted attack with a single restart
reduces the model’s accuracy below 5%.
11 Ensemble Diversity
This paper (Pang et al., 2019) proposes to train an ensemble of models with an additional regular-
ization term that encourages diversity. Compared to single models or less diverse ensembles, this
additional diversity is supposed to make it more difficult for attacks to find minimal adversarial
examples.
11.1 How The Defense Works
Let fm(x) be the probability vector of the m-th model in the ensemble and f(x) =
∑
m fm(x) be
the probability vector output by the ensemble. The ensemble of models is trained on the following
objective,
L(x, y) = −αH(f(x))− βVol2
({
f\ym (x)
})
+
M∑
m
LCE(fm(x), y)
where H(·) is the Shannon entropy, LCE is the standard cross-entropy loss applied to the prediction
of each model and the middle term is the volume spanned by the probability vectors of the individual
models of the ensemble (each normalized to unit length). Note that the volume is only computed
over the non-maximal predictions, i.e. we remove the leading class from each probability vector
fm(x). The rational for doing this is that this will balance accuracy and diversity (the volume can
only increase if the predictions in the non-maximal classes are diverse). The weighting coefficients
α, β are hyper-parameters.
Why we selected this defense. There is a long line of work studying the robustness of neural
network ensembles. Most other work in this direction has not succeeded (He et al., 2017). We
study this defense, along with that of Verma & Swami (2019) (Section 10) and Pang et al. (2019)
(Section 12), to evaluate what appears to be the strongest defenses in this class.
11.2 Initial Hypotheses and Experiments
None of the terms in the loss function seem to encourage any kind of gradient masking. There is
no other mechanism other than the change of the training objective, thus suggesting that standard
off-the-shelve gradient-based attacks should be successful.
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The paper’s results section might impress with the large number of attacks employed against the
ensemble model. However, BIM (Kurakin et al., 2016), PGD (Madry et al., 2017) and MIM (Dong
et al., 2018) are extremely similar and if one of these attacks fails the others are likely to fail as well.
Instead, it is better to employ a more diverse set of attacks, e.g. by including the score-based pixel-
wise attack (Schott et al., 2019b) or the Brendel & Bethge (B&B) attack (Brendel et al., 2019) (the
latter of which was not available at the time of initial publication). Similarly, the results for FGSM
are only useful in that they might signal gradient masking (in particular if FGSM finds adversarial
perturbations where multi-step methods do not) but in general they should always perform worse
then more powerful attacks (which they do here).
Nonetheless, the paper’s results contains a few odd values. For one, the diverse ensemble
reaches higher robustness on CIFAR-10 than a state-of-the-art adversarially trained model (30.4%
compared to 27.8% for  = 0.02). That is fairly unlikely and not mentioned anywhere in the main
text. Second, it is odd that the BIM attack tends to be more effective than PGD given that the
two only differ in their starting points (BIM starts from the original sample while PGD starts from
a random point within the allowed `∞ norm ball). For adversarial training, choosing a random
starting point can mitigate some gradient masking issues. In general, choosing a random starting
point makes the attack converge to different perturbations which can increase success rate by 10%
or more if each sample is attacked multiple times.
These oddities suggest that the attacks might not have converged. And indeed, the paper reports
to have used only 10 iterations for BIM, PGD and MIM (with a step size of /10). Such a small
number of iterations is unlikely to allow the attacks to converge and to find the strongest adversarial
perturbation, suggesting that the attack success can be substantially increased simply by increasing
the number of iterations. The same observation holds for the C&W (Carlini & Wagner, 2017b)
and EAD (Chen et al., 2018) attacks for which the paper reports 1,000 iterations. Due to the inner
hyper-parameter optimization that both attacks employ, this number is still on the low side.
Taken together, our hypothesis was that simply increasing the number of iterations and/or
combining PGD with a substantially different attack such as B&B can substantially increase attack
success.
11.3 Final Robustness Evaluation
For our experiments, we evaluate the authors’ released defense on CIFAR-10 with `∞-bounded
attacks of distortion  = 0.01. We evaluate the strongest ensemble trained with α = 2 and β = 0.5
for which the paper reports an accuracy of 48.4%. Each model of the ensemble is based on the
ResNet-20 architecture.
We started from the evaluation code as well as the pre-trained model weights provided by the
authors. Simply increasing the step size by a factor of three reduces the accuracy from 48% to
26%. Increasing the number of iterations to 50 decreases the accuracy to 20% while 250 iterations
reduced the accuracy to 10%. A further increase did not change the result, suggesting that 250
iterations are sufficient for convergence.
We then repeated the attack three times for each example, which decreased accuracy to 7%
for 250 iterations. The remaining samples seemed to be difficult for PGD, which is why we chose
the `∞ version of the B&B attack (Brendel et al., 2019). In contrast to PGD, which starts at a
point close to the clean sample and moves outwards to the worst-case adversarial within the -ball,
the B&B attack starts from a misclassified sample far away from the clean sample and then moves
along the boundary of adversarial and non-adversarial images towards the clean sample. As initial
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points for the B&B attack, we chose large-perturbation adversarial examples ( = 0.15) generated
by PGD with 20 steps. We then applied B&B with 20 steps. This was sufficient to reach 5%
accuracy. Repeating the attack a few times on the remaining samples reduced the accuracy to 0%.
Lessons Learned.
1. It is important to make sure that attacks actually converged and that the right hyper-parameters
have been chosen. Also, if an attack uses random starting points, the attack should be repeated
several times on each sample.
2. Using very similar attacks such as BIM, PGD or MIM is unlikely to yield very different results.
Instead, attacks that use substantially different strategies such as the B&B attacks (Brendel
et al., 2019) should be considered.
Exercises for the reader.
1. The optimal step size and the necessary number of iterations substantially differ between at-
tacks but also between different defenses. Compare a few attacks (e.g. PGD, C&W, B&B as
well as some score- and decision-based attacks). How many steps does each attack need until
convergence? How sensitive are the results to the attack’s hyper-parameters (e.g. the step size)?
2. Repeating attacks a few times can substantially lower model accuracy. Which attacks can profit
most from repetitions?
12 EMPIR
This paper (Sen et al., 2020) is the third defense we study that develops a method to defend against
adversarial examples by constructing an ensemble of models, but this time with mixed precision of
weights and activations.
12.1 How The Defense Works
This paper trains multiple models {fi} with different levels of precision on the weights and on the
activations for each and returns the output as the majority vote of the models. Concretely, for a
CIFAR-10 defense the paper uses one full-precision model, one model trained with 2-bit activations
and 4-bit weights, and another model with 2-bit activations and 2-bit weights.
Why we selected this defense. The prior two ensemble defenses we studied were not effective;
however this defense takes a different approach by training low-precision models.
12.2 Initial Hypotheses and Experiments
«««< HEAD This paper does not contain an explicit analysis of its robustness to adaptive at-
tacks, but performs an analaysis of the defense ======= This paper does not contain an
analysis of its robustness to adaptive attacks, but performs an analysis of the defense »»»>
f955acd60b6d9b33ef099000d0249a2eead2cc60 to standard gradient-based attacks on the ensemble.
However, given that the defense has potentially non-differentiable layers we believed that it may be
possible for various forms of gradient masking to occur. Investigating the code, we found that the
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paper does include a BPDA-style estimate of the gradient of the backward pass. Thus, we expected
that performing gradient descent with respect to the entire model ensemble and carefully ensuring
that gradient information was correctly propagated through the model would suffice to bypass this
defense.
12.3 Final Robustness Evaluation
We begin by constructing a loss function that we will use to generate adversarial examples. As a
first attempt at an attack, we form the simplest loss function that we could imagine: take the class
probability vectors of the three models f1(x), f2(x), f3(x) and average them component-wise so that
the prediction of our agglomerated model for class i is given by fˆ(x)i = 13 (f1(x)i + f2(x)i + f3(x)i).
Then we perform PGD on the cross-entropy loss for this model fˆ . Notice that this loss function is
not consistent, violating one of our lessons: because the classifier takes the majority vote in order
to decide the final prediction, only two of the classifiers must agree on the target class; the third
model could have 0 confidence. However, before we spend any extra effort developing a stronger
loss function we test this simple loss function.
Surprisingly, we find that it is effective. By running 100 iterations of PGD on this loss function,
we are able to reduce the accuracy of the defense to 1.5% at ε = 0.031 (the original evaluation
reported accuracy of 13.5% at ε = 0.1 with 40 iterations of PGD).
Lessons Learned.
1. The attack themes we distill in Section 4 are not hard-and-fast rules: it is possible to evade
defenses while also (knowingly) disregarding them.
2. Ensembles of weak defenses still appear weak (He et al., 2017).
Exercises for the reader.
1. We only construct a very simple loss function that reduces model accuracy to 1.5%. Can a
stronger (probably consistent) loss function reduce the accuracy to 0%? At ε = 4/255?
2. Try to attack each of the models fi individually. Are they all similarly robust, or is one
harder to attack than the others? (If the robustness of the models differ, how might a more
consistent loss function look to attack the full defense).
13 Temporal Dependency
This defense (Yang et al., 2019b) detects adversarial examples for automatic speech recognition.
13.1 How The Defense Works
Given an audio sample x ∈ [−1, 1]t represented as the raw audio waveform, an automatic speech
recognition system generates a transcription of the input as y ∈ Yn where Y is the output space of
tokens—in this paper, a character “a” through “z” or the whitespace token.
In order to detect if a given input is adversarial, the detection procedure checks if the classifi-
cation of the first half of the audio waveform is similar to the first half of the classification of the
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complete audio waveform. Formally, let s1..k denote the prefix of length k for a sequence s, and
let len(s) return the length of a sequence. The defense begins by setting xpre = x1..k (the method
for selecting k will be discussed later). Then, compute the predicted classification y = f(x) of the
full audio waveform x and ypre = f(xpre) as the prediction of the length-k prefix of x. From here,
let l = len(ypre) and compute φ = sim(y1..l, ypre) where sim computes the similarity between y1..l
and ypre according to some metric. If φ is large then the audio is determined to be adversarial;
otherwise if φ is small then the audio is said to be benign.
In order to compute the similarity, the paper proposes various metrics sim; because they all
perform roughly the same, we choose the simplest to evaluate: the character error rate. That is, we
compute the Levenshtein (edit) distance between the two strings. From source code we obtained
from the authors we found that the only detail in the implementation is that the edit distance omits
whitespace characters before computing the distance.
It only remains to discuss how to compute k. The majority of the paper considers the case
where k = t/2, so xpre is the first half of the audio sample. The authors additionally study the
cases were k is selected either from some small set of values, or where k is sampled uniformly at
random from 0.2 to 0.8. In order to attack the most difficult version of the defense we fool the full
randomized version of the detector.
Why we selected this defense. This is the only defense that we have seen at ICLR, ICML
or NeurIPS that is not focused on image classification; we therefore consider it an interesting case
study.
13.2 Initial Hypotheses and Experiments
The paper performs an extensive adaptive attack evaluation, trying three different attack techniques.
One of these attacks looked almost exactly like what we believe would be the correct attack: select
a target sequence t, and let tpre denote the prefix of t. Then, set the loss function to minimize the
loss on both the transcription of the prefixed input f(xpre) and on the full input f(x), where the loss
on the prefixed input is determined by the loss between the classification of f(xpre) and the prefix
of the target sequence t. We noticed one potential failure mode. First, a single hyper-parameter
controls the relative importance of both loss terms: the minimized loss function is:
‖δ‖2 + λ ·
(
L(f(x′), t) + L(f(x′pre), tpre)
)
,
instead of what we would have expected:
‖δ‖2 + λ1 · L(f(x′), t) + λ2 · L(f(x′pre), tpre).
We were confident that there was some error in the evaluation because the success rate of the
attack is low for an unbounded attack: even when never placing a bound on the total distortion
the adversarial is allowed to make, the attack does not succeed 100% of the time at fooling the
detector. Such an unbounded attacker should always eventually succeed, if only by adding so much
noise that the original audio is completely unrecognizable.
Our guess as to why this may happen comes from our experience with the original attack
codebase, which is not a simple attack and can thus be hard to debug. Because the objective of the
attack is to generate adversarial examples of minimal distortion, the default attack is implemented
as follows. First, choose an arbitrary distortion bound τ that is sufficiently large. Then, perform
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PGD (Madry et al., 2017) on this distortion-bounded input space. Once the attack is successful
at fooling the classifier, the distortion bound is reduced by 10% and the attack repeats. There are
a number of details here which could have complicated the attack process, however because the
authors do not release source code for the attack we are unable to confirm our hypotheses.
13.3 Final Robustness Evaluation
We implemented the attack as described in the paper, beginning with just one hyper-parameter
λ—we only wanted to introduce a new hyper-parameter if it turned out to be necessary. Specifically,
we perform gradient descent on the loss function L(x′) = L(f(x′), t) +L(f(x′pre), tpre) where tpre is
computed as the first l characters of the true prediction t where l = len(f(x′pre)). Importantly, this
is not just the first l characters of f(x′): this value might not be the correct output at any point in
time. If we try to send f(x′pre) towards the current prediction f(x′) the two loss functions will be
in conflict with each other. However, because we know that f(x′) will eventually equal t, we send
f(x′pre) to the prefix of t. Once both the prediction of the model reaches our desired target phrase
and the detector is fooled completely (i.e., f(x′pre) = ypre exactly) we reduce the distortion bound
and continue our search.
In order to ensure that our adversarial examples remain effective under random choices of the
prefix length k we run our attack by, in parallel, ensuring that the attack is successful with k = .25,
k = .5 and k = .75 all simultaneously. We hope from here that this implies robustness to values in
between (and empirically we find it does).
There are two important differences between this evaluation and all other evaluations in this
paper. First, we perform a targeted attack here: untargeted attacks are uninteresting on audio
classification because they typically just induce misspellings. Second, because we run an unbounded
attack, instead of reporting the success rate at a given distortion bound, we report the median
distance to generate a successful perturbation. Success rates for unbounded attacks should always
be 100% and are not valid points of comparison: given sufficient distortion, eventually we will
succeed. Indeed, we succeed in generating adversarial examples successfully that reach the target
class 100% of the time, and that fool the detector 100% of the time.
On a baseline classifier, we require a median `∞ distortion of 41 (out of a 16-bit integer range of
65536). For the classifier defended with this defense, we require a distortion of 46, a slight increase
but not significantly higher than baseline defenses (e.g., bit quantization).
Lessons Learned.
1. Subtle differences in attack implementations can distinguish between effective and ineffective
attacks.
2. Defenses that do not rely on principled inclusion of randomness rarely benefit from its addition.
Exercises for the reader.
1. The proposed defense checks that f(xpre) = ypre. Instead consider an alternate defense that
splits the audio in two two halves, the left half xl and the right half xr; the detection mechanism
checks whether or not f(x) = f(xl) || f(xr) where || denotes string concatenation. Is this defense
effective?
2. What is the median `∞ distortion required to fool the model into outputting an empty tran-
scription (i.e., a sequence of whitespace characters)?
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14 Mixup Inference
This paper (Pang et al., 2020b) employs a stochastic interpolation procedure during inference in
order to mitigate the effect of adversarial perturbations.
14.1 How The Defense Works
The defense works as follows. For each input x (e.g. a clean or perturbed image) we compute K
interpolations with samples sk,
x˜k = λx+ (1− λ)sk.
where λ is a fixed hyper-parameter (λ = 0.6 in all experiments) and sk is sampled randomly from a
predefined set of images S. We then average the logit responses z(·) of the undefended model over
all K interpolations, i.e. the final response zˆ(·) of the defended model is
zˆ(x) =
1
k
K∑
k=1
z(x˜k) =
1
k
K∑
k=1
z(λx+ (1− λ)sk).
The paper develops two instantiations of the defenses: OL (other label) and PL (predicted label).
The two types only differ in how sk is sampled from S. For OL we sample sk uniformly from all
images for which the predicted label is different from x. For PL we sample sk uniformly from all
images for which the predicted label is the same as for x. The defense is applied with K = 1 during
training and with K = 15 (OL) or K = 5 (PL) during testing.
The motivation for this defense is two-fold: for one, the effect of a perturbation δ is reduced
by λ due to the interpolation. Second, the manuscript hypothesizes that a perturbation δ tends to
have an effect on the model only close to a given input x and that the large shifts towards other
samples breaks the effect of δ on the model.
Why we selected this defense. Defenses that employ stochastic elements are notoriously dif-
ficult to evaluate for two reasons. First, most attacks implicitly assume the targeted model to be
deterministic. Breaking this assumption is a common cause for attack failure. Second, the qual-
ity of an adversarial perturbation now has to be measured as the average success rate, i.e. how
often it can fool the model, which makes it difficult to select good adversarial perturbations (e.g.
across repetitions and attacks). The Mixup defense is a particularly interesting instantiation of
a stochastic defense because of its non-local mixing mechanism that interpolates between distant
images.
14.2 Initial Hypotheses and Experiments
A large portion of the paper’s main body is dedicated to an oblivious threat model in which the
attacker is assumed to be unaware of the defense. This is not an interesting scenario: defending
against a naïve attacker is not hard. Evaluating such a scenario is only interesting as a sanity check,
but we recommend against presenting these results in the main body.
There is a brief discussion of adaptive attacks. For an adversarially trained model, the results
are very similar to the oblivious attack, which raises a red flag: an adaptive attack should almost
always perform substantially better than an oblivious attack that ignores the defense. This behav-
ior suggests that the adaptive attack is not well suited for this defense. The exact algorithm of
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the adaptive attack is left unclear: the paper describes the adaptive attack as an average across
multiple adversarial examples generated by PGD against the same sample. In the paper’s appendix,
however, the adaptive attack is described as a single PGD attack in which the gradient is estimated
across multiple linear mixtures. The source code reveals that the first method was used, and that
is problematic. Averaging across adversarial perturbations that have each been produced by an
ineffective attack is unlikely to lead to much better adversarial examples. A stronger approach
would be to average the gradient in each step of the attack.
Taken together, these observations suggest that a correctly adapted attack algorithm that takes
the defense mechanism into account might be able to break the defense.
14.3 Final Robustness Evaluation
We perform our evaluation on CIFAR10 using the code released by the authors. The threat model we
use is `∞ attacks bounded by  = 8/255. We evaluate the paper’s strongest base model (Interpolated
adversarial training) which reaches 42.5% accuracy on untargeted attacks without the defense,
compared to 63.4% (oblivious attack) or roughly 57% (adaptive attack, read off from Figure 4) for
the defended model (MI-OL). We only evaluate the OL defense as suggested by the authors (private
communication).
We include the mixing step into our attack. During the attack we backpropagate through
the complete mixing mechanism using the same number of samples as used during evaluation. We
applied PGD with 50 steps and a step-size of 1/255. During the attack and during evaluation of the
perturbations we choose the mixing images randomly in every step. This procedure was sufficient
to reduce the accuracy of the model to 43.9%, very close to the accuracy of the base model without
the Mixup defense. It is likely that one can further reduce accuracy through additional repetitions
or steps, but due to the computational overhead of the Mixup mechanism, we did not perform
additional experiments.
Lessons Learned.
1. The majority of the evaluation should focus on adaptive attacks, and not on attacks that are
oblivious to the defense mechanism. Experiments with oblivious attacks are helpful sanity check
and we recommend that authors include them in an appendix.
2. For stochastic defenses, rather than averaging over the results of n failed gradient-based attacks,
it is better to stabilize the gradients of the model by averaging over n queries. Only a stable
gradient will allow an iterative gradient-based attack to succeed.
Exercises for the reader.
1. Additional repetitions of PGD can typically reduce model accuracy by a few percentage points
but for stochastic models care has to be taken as to which perturbation to choose. How much
more can this model’s accuracy be reduced using more attack repetitions?
2. A standard component of attacks against stochastic defenses is EOT. Interestingly, we did not
need to use EOT in this evaluation, but can it be used to further reduce model accuracy?
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15 ME-Net
This paper (Yang et al., 2019a) proposes a pre-processing step that randomly discards a large
fraction of pixels in an image, and then uses matrix-estimation techniques to reconstruct the image.
The defense trains a model on such pre-processed inputs, with the aim of learning representations
that are less sensitive to small input variations.
15.1 How The Defense Works
Given an image x represented as a matrixM , the defense first drops each entry inM independently
with some probability p to obtain a noisy matrix N . It then reconstructs a matrix Mˆ from N that
should be close to M in expectation. Various matrix-estimation techniques are proposed. The ones
we focus on here reconstruct M using universal singular value thresholding (USVT) (Chatterjee
et al., 2015) or nuclear-norm minimization (Candès & Recht, 2009).
To train a model, n random noisy matrices are generated for each training input x, and the
respective matrix reconstructions Mˆ (1), . . . , Mˆ (n) are added to the training set. A standard classifier
is then trained on this expanded dataset. At inference, a single random noisy matrix is generated.
The classifier processes the reconstruction of that matrix.
To combine the defense with adversarial training, the model is trained on adversarial examples
from a PGD attack (Madry et al., 2017) that uses the BPDA technique (Athalye et al., 2018a)
to backpropagate through the matrix estimation step. Here, instead of pre-generating n matrix
reconstructions for each training input, a noisy matrix and corresponding matrix reconstruction is
computed for every step of PGD.
Why we selected this defense. There have been a number of defenses proposed with a similar
randomized pre-processing step (Prakash et al., 2018; Guo et al., 2018) which have been broken by
adaptive attacks (Athalye et al., 2018a; Athalye & Carlini, 2018). Yet, this paper does perform a
thorough adaptive evaluation and concludes that the defense is sound. We thus viewed this defense
as an interesting case-study: if we succeed in finding an attack on it, why did the adaptive attacks
on similar prior defenses fail?
15.2 Initial Hypotheses and Experiments
Our first impression from this defense was simply that the proposed idea is too similar to previously
broken defenses. At the same time, the paper does perform a fairly thorough evaluation of the
defense, against a combination of black-box, white-box and adaptive attacks. Taking a closer look
at this evaluation, we notice a few areas of concern.
Since the defense’s pre-processing is non-differentiable, the main white-box attack considered
in the paper uses PGD with the BPDA technique of (Athalye et al., 2018a). To approximate
gradients, the pre-processing is applied in the forward pass, but replaced by the identity function in
the backward pass. The rationale for applying BPDA is that the pre-processing step (i.e., randomly
dropping pixels and applying matrix estimation) computes a function that is close to the identity.
While this use of BPDA appears appropriate, the paper does not take the most appropriate steps
to deal with the defense’s randomness. The defense is evaluated on attacks with multiple random
restarts, but this is typically insufficient if the gradient computations at each step of the attack do
not account for the defense’s stochasticity. In the same vein, the paper reports success in defending
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against the score-based attack of Uesato et al. (2018) and the decision-based attack of Brendel et al.
(2018), both of which fare poorly against randomized defenses.
The paper considers two adaptive attacks. The first finds an adversarial perturbation for the
reconstructed image, and then applies it to the original image. The second applies BPDA and
then projects the gradient onto a low-rank subspace so that the attack focuses on global image
structures. Both these attacks are found to perform significantly worse than PGD with BPDA,
which demonstrates that they are not the most appropriate adaptive attacks.
We formulate the following hypotheses as to how this defense could be broken:
1. The attack should average over the randomness of the defense, using EOT (see Section 2.1).
2. The paper seems to apply BPDA in a coarse fashion. As the initial randomized masking step is
differentiable, a stronger attack might use BPDA to only approximate gradients of the matrix-
estimation computation, rather than of the full pre-processing.
3. Score-based attacks (Ilyas et al., 2018; Chen et al., 2017) might provide better gradients than
BPDA, if combined with EOT.
We evaluate the defense on CIFAR-10, using code and models shared by the authors. We use
the threat model from the paper, `∞ attacks with  = 8/255. We focus our evaluation on the USVT
approach, for which we could obtain a standard model as well as an adversarially trained model
from the authors. We call these models USVT and USVTADV. After completing our evaluation,
we further trained a standard model using nuclear-norm minimization and tested our best attack
on that model as well.14
We first reproduce the paper’s white-box attack that uses BPDA to approximate the entire
pre-processing step with the identity function. The approximated gradient is used in a PGD attack
with 200 steps. This attack reduces the models’ accuracy to 35% for USVT and 50% for USVTADV,
which is consistent with results reported in the paper.
We then attempted an attack that combines BPDA with EOT. We approximate the gradient 40
times with different random masks, and use the average gradient in a PGD attack. This reduced the
models’ accuracies to 15% for USVT and 32% for USVTADV. Note that the accuracy for USVTADV
is lower than that obtained with adversarial training alone (the same ResNet-18 model architecture
achieves over 40% robust accuracy with adversarial training). The reason for this is probably
because the attack used during training (PGD+BPDA) is not strong enough to approximate worst-
case adversarial examples for this defense.
15.3 Final Robustness Evaluation
We were curious as to why the BPDA+EOT attack did not have an even higher success rate for
the standard model trained with USVT matrix estimation.
First, we found that the defense’s randomness causes significant fluctuations in the model’s
outputs: when classifying inputs multiple times in a row, we find that there’s a non-negligible
chance of the model misclassifying an input due to a “bad” choice of random mask. This brittleness
of the defense may also make it harder to produce robust adversarial examples.
We further investigated whether the assumption underlying the use of BPDA was valid, namely
that the pre-processing step approximates the identity function. Surprisingly, we found that this is
14Adversarial training with the nuclear-norm approach is extremely expensive (on the order of 10 CPU years) and
we could not obtain a pre-trained model for this setting. So we refrain from evaluating it.
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not necessarily the case for the USVT approach. For CIFAR-10 images, USVT fails to reconstruct
an image close to the original. In fact, we find that the output of the pre-processing step is roughly
identical to the randomly masked image. We thus tried to apply BPDA only to the USVT procedure,
and backpropagate through the random mask. However, this attack did not improve upon the 15%
accuracy we reached when applying BPDA to the full pre-processing step (in fact, applying BPDA
solely to USVT resulted in a slightly worse attack).
Taking a step back (and while trying to find bugs in our own attack implementation), we
attempted to attack solely the trained classifier (a ResNet-18), without the pre-processing stage.
Surprisingly, we found the base classifier to be moderately robust: For `∞-noise bounded by  =
8/255, we could not get its accuracy below 10%. We further checked the model’s gradients, and
found them to be highly interpretable, a phenomenon previously demonstrated for adversarially
trained models (Tsipras et al., 2019). The non-trivial robustness of this base classifier is quite
remarkable, as it was trained in a standard fashion on randomly masked and reconstructed images.
This gives credence to the authors’ intuition that training on randomly masked and reconstructed
images can encourage a model to learn somewhat more robust representations. Altogether, this
suggests that an attack on the full defense is unlikely to bring the model’s accuracy much further
down than our best attack.
Finally, we evaluated a model trained with nuclear-norm minimization. Due to the high com-
putational cost of that defense (the nuclear-norm minimization is CPU-bound and takes about one
second per input), we refrained from performing any additional adaptive experiments, and simply
used the best attack we found for the USVT model (i.e., BPDA+EOT). This attack reduced the
accuracy of the nuclear-norm defense to 13%, a similar result as for the defense instantiated with
USVT.
Lessons Learned.
1. Attacks must account for all of the randomness of a defense.
2. For defenses that train a base classifier with additional components, an ablation study can reveal
where the increased robustness comes from.
Exercises for the reader.
1. Why does training on masked and reconstructed inputs led to a base classifier with low yet
non-trivial robustness? Or can the base classifier be attacked with a stronger attack?
2. Is there a differentiable version of USVT so as to remove the need for BPDA in the attack?
16 Asymmetrical Adversarial Training
This paper (Yin et al., 2020) proposes to use adversarially-trained models to detect adversarial
examples. The idea is a natural extension to the work of Madry et al. (2017).
16.1 How The Defense Works
For a K-class problem, the defense uses K detector models h1, . . . , hK . Given an input x, the i-th
detector outputs a logit score hi(x) ∈ R for class i. Let σ(·) denote the sigmoid function. The
detectors are adversarially trained so that for each training input (x, y), we maximize σ(hy(x)) and
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minimize the terms max||δ||≤ σ(hi(x+ δ)), for all i 6= y. The first term ensures that the detector of
the correct class y recognizes x as benign. The other terms encourage the detectors of classes i 6= y
to reject perturbed versions of x.
The paper proposes two classification frameworks:
1. The integrated classifier uses a standard “base” classifier f(x) to output a prediction f(x) = y.
The input is then fed to the detector for that class, hy, and rejected if the logit hy(x) is below
some threshold τ .
2. The generative classifier computes a logit vector from the scores of all detectors. The classifier’s
prediction is f(x) = arg maxi hi(x) and low confidence inputs are rejected (i.e., if maxhi(x) < τ
for some threshold τ).
Why we selected this defense. This defense is interesting in that the authors seemed to have
done everything right. The proposed adaptive attack (see below) is well motivated and introduces
no unnecessary complexity. We initially believed that this defense would resist our own adaptive
attacks.
16.2 Initial Hypotheses and Experiments
Compared to many other defenses, this ensemble of adversarially-trained detectors is fairly simple (a
positive trait in our opinion). The classifier is built from K standard models, none of which should
(a priori) show any signs of gradient masking or other optimization difficulties. The defense’s
evaluation is also quite appropriate. The detectors are first evaluated in isolation using standard
attacks, and the authors further propose an adaptive attack with a loss function tailored to the full
defense. Finally, the authors show that their robust detectors are invertible. That is, an unbounded
attack that maximizes the score of a detector results in semantically meaningful images from that
class—mirroring similar results for adversarially trained classifiers (Santurkar et al., 2019). Overall,
this gives good credence that this defense is indeed robust.
A closer look at the defense’s evaluation does however reveal one issue: a sub-optimal choice
of loss function in the considered adaptive attack. Let z(x)i ∈ R denote the i-th logit of the base
classifier. Given an input (x, y), the attack on the integrated classifier finds an adversarial example
x′ that maximizes:
L(x′, y) =
maxi 6=y z(x
′)i − z(x′)y if f(x′) = y
max
i 6=y
hi(x
′) otherwise
.
In words, the attack first finds an x′ that is misclassified by the base classifier, using a standard
loss function proposed in (Carlini & Wagner, 2017b). Then, once the base classifier is fooled, the
attack further maximizes the scores of all detectors other than that of the true class y, to ensure
that the example is not rejected.
The issue with this loss function is that the second term, maxi 6=y hi(x′), does not capture the
true attack objective. Indeed, to bypass the defense, we only need to fool the detector of the class
predicted by the base classifier, i.e., y′ = f(x′). Maximizing the scores of all detectors is thus
wasteful of the attack’s limited perturbation budget.
The adaptive attack on the generative classifier has a similar issue. Here, the proposed loss
function is simply:
L(x′, y) = max
i 6=y
hi(x
′) .
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That is, the attack maximizes the score of the most confident detector other than the one of the
true class. The issue is that even with an unbounded perturbation, maximizing this loss may fail
to produce a successful attack. For example, one way to maximize this loss function is to increase
each detectors’ score by the same value, thereby leaving the classifier’s prediction unchanged.
16.3 Final Robustness Evaluation
We evaluate pre-trained CIFAR-10 detectors released by the authors. We report results for `∞
attacks with  = 8/255.
We first describe our attack on the integrated classifier. A natural idea for improving the loss
function from the paper would be to first fool the base classifier into outputting some class f(x′) 6= y,
and then to maximize the score of the detector for class f(x′):
L(x′, y) =
maxi 6=y z(x
′)i − z(x′)y if f(x′) = y
hf(x′)(x
′) otherwise
.
However, we tend to dislike loss functions of this type as work is still wasted if the classifier’s
prediction f(x′) ever switches from some class i 6= y to another class j 6= y. Instead, we formulate
a targeted attack objective:
Lt(x
′) = z(x′)t −max
i6=t
z(x′)i
L(x′, t) =
{
Lt(x
′) if Lt(x′) < κ
ht(x
′) otherwise
.
That is, we first fool the base classifier into outputting the target class t, and then maximize the
score of the detector for the target class. The small constant κ > 0 ensures that f ’s targeted
misclassification is not overly brittle. We stop the optimization on the base classifier f once a
targeted misclassification is achieved since the confidence of f is not considered by the defense.
We then perform a multi-targeted attack (Gowal et al., 2019; Carlini, 2019): for each target
class t 6= y, we maximize L(x′, t) using 100 PGD steps, and we retain the best adversarial example
across all K − 1 attacks.
This attack is substantially more effective than the one in the paper’s evaluation. At a False-
Positive-Rate of 5%, we reduce the detector’s robust accuracy from 30% to 11%.
For the generative classifier, we also used a multi-targeted attack as it is typically very ef-
fective (Gowal et al., 2019). Our objective maximizes the score of the targeted detector, while
minimizing the highest detector score, until the targeted detector’s score is highest. At that point,
we further maximize the target detector’s score to ensure a confident prediction:
Lt(x
′) = ht(x′)−max
i 6=t
hi(x
′)
L(x′, t) =
{
Lt(x
′) if Lt(x′) < κ
ht(x
′) otherwise
.
At a False-Positive-Rate of 5%, the multi-targeted attack (with 100 steps of PGD per target) reduces
the generative classifier’s robust accuracy from 55% to 37%, lower than that of full PGD adversarial
training.
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This suggests that the attacks used at training time might not be optimal either. Recall that
the defense is trained so as to maximize σ(hy(x)) and minimize max||δ||≤ σ(hi(x + δ)) for i 6= y.
Intuitively, while this ensures that the detectors for class i 6= y have low confidence on adversarial
examples, it does not ensure that the detector for the true class has high confidence on adversarial
examples. Adversarially training all detectors for each input might lead to a more robust defense.
Given that our attacks did not fully reduce the accuracy of either model to 0%, one may wonder
why we are confident that our evaluation is sufficiently thorough that we have accurately evaluated
the defense’s robustness to within a small margin. As this defense is not certified, our evaluation
will ultimately always be empirical. We believe it unlikely we can significantly reduce the defense’s
accuracy further due to the following:
• The defense’s simplicity, which does not suggest any gradient masking issues.
• The defense’s strong interpretability—as demonstrated by the authors—which had been previ-
ously observed in other robust models.
• Our attacks’ simplicity, which reduces the risk of implementation errors or of wasting pertur-
bation budget on unnecessary objectives.
• The defenses’ resilience under standard checks (Carlini et al., 2019): increasing the number of
PGD iterations (to 200) and random restarts (to 10), only reduce the defense’s accuracy by an
extra 1%.
Lessons Learned.
1. A good loss function has the property that increasing the loss always increases the attack success
rate. Loss functions without this property can “waste” the perturbation budget on orthogonal
objectives.
2. It is sometimes easier to write down a good targeted loss function than an untargeted one. A
“multi-targeted” attack that targets each class in turn will be more effective than an untargeted
attack in such a case.
Exercises for the reader.
1. Can the accuracy of the defense be reduced further, especially for the generative classifier?
2. Are there other defenses that can be attacked by formulating an untargeted attack as a series
of multiple targeted attacks?
17 Turning a Weakness into a Strength
This defense (Hu et al., 2019) is an adversarial example detector. While the defense is conceptu-
ally simple, the original evaluation methodology is complex and constructing a single unified loss
function that encodes the attacker’s objective is challenging.
17.1 How The Defense Works
Note that in this section, we sometimes use f(x) to refer to either the classifier’s output class, or
the full vector of class probabilities. The choice should be clear from context. We denote by f(x)i
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the probability that the classifier assigns to class i. To determine if a given input x is adversarial,
the defense sets thresholds τ1 and τ2 and checks if either of the following are true:
1.
∑
i‖f(x+ δ)i − f(x)i‖1 > τ1 for δ ∼ N (0, Iσ2); or,
2. #Steps(f, x) > τ2 where #Steps returns the number of steps required to generate an adver-
sarial example x′ such that either (a) f(x) 6= y or (b) f(x) = t.
The first term is simple: the models predictions should not change substantially when the input
is slightly perturbed by Gaussian noise. An idea related to this term alone has previously been
suggested as a defense (Cao & Gong, 2017) and was subsequently broken (He et al., 2018).
The second loss term is more complicated: given an input x we compute the number of steps
necessary to turn x into an adversarial example x′. Intuitively, this check enforces that x is not
high confidence: if it is too far from the decision boundary, then this test will fail. This would have
prevented He et al.’s attack.
Why we selected this defense. This defense is conceptually simple, but by construction it
is hard to define a straightforward differentiable loss function that can be minimized to generate
adversarial examples against it. This defense relies on ideas similar to the defense in Section 6.
17.2 Initial Hypotheses and Experiments
The paper contains an adaptive attack by developing a new loss function that is designed to evade
the defense. This loss function is defined as a combination of four independent loss terms L =
λL1 + L2 + L3 + L4.
The first term L1 is a standard cross-entropy loss to fool the classifier, L1 = LCE(f(x), ytrue).
The second loss term encourages the classifier to be confident in its prediction by directly op-
timizing the first detection term L2 = Eδ∼N (0,Iσ2) [‖f(x)− f(x′ + δ)‖1] in order to defeat the
first detector. The third loss term encourages the classifier to have a high loss after taking a
single gradient descent step of size α towards any incorrect class y′ L3 = −Ey′ 6=ytLCE(f(x −
α∇xLCE(f(x), y′)), yt) and the final loss term encourages the same but for the target class yt.
L4 = −LCE(f(x+ α∇xLCE(f(x), yt)), yt) Loss functions L3 and L4 are non-differentiable, and so
the paper applies BPDA (Athalye et al., 2018a).
This combined loss function is exceptionally complicated, and it is unlikely that optimizing it
would be able to minimize all four terms simultaneously. The lack of additional weighting terms λ
on each hyper-parameter made us suspect that when generating an adversarial examples, L1 would
dominate and the remaining loss terms would not actually change the final resulting adversarial
example. Combining just two terms together can often be difficult (Carlini & Wagner, 2017a) and
requires adaptively tuning the hyper-parameter λ; combining four introduces even more complexity.
The paper applies PGD using the standard cross-entropy loss (Madry et al., 2017) and the logit
margin loss (Carlini & Wagner, 2017b). Typically, the difference between these two losses is small:
a few percentage points or less. However this paper finds a large difference in many settings. For
example, at a distortion bound of  = 0.1 the PGD on the cross entropy loss succeeds just 8.5%
of the time. In comparison, the margin loss succeeds over 32% of the time. This large of a gap
is atypical; we suspected the root cause to be a non-standard experimental methodology or attack
implementation.
As a result, we inspected the open-source implementation provided by the authors. The paper
implements its own attack algorithms instead of calling a primitive from some reference attack
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library such as Foolbox (Rauber et al., 2017) or CleverHans (Papernot et al., 2016a). We find
that the implemented attack does not take the sign of the gradient when implementing `∞ PGD
(Madry et al., 2017). The typical definition of `∞ PGD is to define normalize(x) = sign(x). The
implementation of PGD contained in this paper does not include the sign operator and does not
normalize the gradient. Importantly, the paper makes no definition of PGD and as such does not
explicitly state if their PGD method includes this normalization step.15
Thus, this explains the artifact we observed where the logit margin loss is superior to cross-
entropy loss. The magnitude of the gradient of the cross entropy loss can vary by several orders
of magnitude. When the classifier is confident in its prediction, as is typically the case for poorly-
calibrated models, ‖∇LCE‖ is often exceptionally small: 10−5 or lower. In contrast, when the
classifier is not confident and the top two predictions are almost equally likely, ‖∇LCE‖ can be as
large as 1. The gradient of the margin loss is much better behaved: it tends to not change by more
than an order of magnitude.
More concerning than the fact that the implementation of PGD used to attack the network does
not contain the sign operator, the implementation of PGD used in phase (2) of the defense (that
computes #Steps) omits the sign operator. Because the defense uses the number of steps of gradient
descent as a proxy for the `p distance to the decision boundary itself (instead of using the distance
to the decision boundary directly), this implementation difference is extremely important. The
defense would probably have been more effective if it had used the standard attack implementation
with the sign on the gradient.
17.3 Final Robustness Evaluation
The core assumption the defense relies on is that there do not exist inputs that (a) have high
confidence on random noise, but (b) are still close to the decision boundary when running an
adversarial attack. One option would be to mount a feature adversary attack as we did against
a similar defense in Section 6. However, in this section we aim to mount a new type of adaptive
attack. We set out to directly construct an input with properties (a) and (b) above, by initially
generating an adversarial example with high confidence and then slowly moving it towards the
decision boundary.
For an input example x we initially generate a high-confidence adversarial example x′ by running
100 steps of PGD (with the sign on the gradient). Then, we let xα = α · x′ + (1 − α) · x linearly
interpolate between the original example and the adversarial example, such that x0 = x and x1 = x′.
We find that often, there exists a choice xα∗ that it is still high confidence but also is sufficiently
close to the decision boundary that the defense will not reject it.
Our first attack simply samples 1,000 values of α between 0 and 1 and checks if the defense’s
checks (1) and (2) are both satisfied for any of these examples. There are two problems with this
approach. First, it is computationally expensive: the detection method has an inline loop that runs
PGD and therefore to generate a single adversarial example requires several minutes. Worse, we
find that it sometimes fails when a more fine-grained search would have succeeded, because the
necessary value of α to fool the defense is very small, i.e., α < 10−4. Increasing the number of steps
is one possible solution—which we used to diagnose the failure here—but is even slower.
To improve the computational complexity, we instead perform a binary search to find a value
of α so that both defense properties (1) and (2) hold. We initialize αlow = 0 and αhigh = 1. We
define αmid = (αlow + αhigh)/2 and evaluate xαmid . If property (1) holds but property (2) does
15In personal communication with the authors they state that they intended for PGD to not have the sign operator.
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not, then we know that the current input is robust to noise but too far away from the decision
boundary, and thus we would like to move it closer to the boundary. So we set αlow = αmid and
recurse. Conversely, if property (1) does not hold but property (2) does hold, then we are too
close to the decision boundary and need to back away. We set αhigh = αmid and recurse. If both
properties hold, we have a successful adversarial example. If neither hold, we randomly generate a
new adversarial example x′ and repeat the binary search procedure for this example.
The most important reason why this attack is effective is that it is simple to analyze. It can
be difficult to diagnose why gradient descent fails, and so designing attacks that are as simple as
possible makes it easy to diagnose why they are not working effectively. When simple techniques
do not work as expected, it is easy to learn the correct lesson for why they failed. In contrast, when
complex techniques do not work as expected, one has to consider multiple hypotheses and evaluate
each one to understand the true reason for failure.
This attack is successful at reducing the accuracy of the classifier on CIFAR-10 to 0% at a 0%
detection rate, and similarly bring the ImageNet classifier to < 1% accuracy at a 0% detection rate,
both in the threat model originally considered by the paper.
Lessons Learned.
1. Combining multiple terms together leads to difficult-to-optimize loss functions that may not
behave as desired.
2. BPDA should not be treated as a general-purpose method for minimizing through arbitrarily
non-differentiable functions. Rather, loss functions must be designed to work with BPDA and
must already be almost differentiable.
Exercises for the reader.
1. Can the proposed defense be defeated with a feature adversary, instead of the special-purpose
attack we construct?
2. If the defense had applied standard PGD, taking the sign of the gradient before gradient steps,
would it be more robust?
18 Conclusion
We see a marked improvement in defense evaluations compared to those studied in prior work
(Carlini & Wagner, 2017a; Athalye et al., 2018a): nearly all defense evaluations we study perform
adaptive attacks that aim to evade the proposed defense. However, we find that despite the presence
of an adaptive attack evaluation, all thirteen defenses we analyzed could be circumvented.
We have described a number of attack strategies that proved useful in circumventing different
defenses. Yet, we urge the community to refrain from using these adaptive attacks as templates
to be copied in future evaluations. To illustrate why, we propose the following informal “no-free-
lunch-theorem”:
For any proposed attack, it is possible to build a non-
robust defense that prevents the proposed attack.
Such a defense is generally not interesting. We thus encourage viewing robustness evaluations
against prior attacks (including adaptive attacks on prior defenses) only as a useful sanity check.
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The main focus of a robustness evaluation should be on developing comprehensive adaptive attacks
that explicitly uncover and target the defense’s weakest links (by making use of prior techniques
only if appropriate). In particular, we strongly encourage authors to focus their evaluation solely
on adaptive attacks (and defer evaluations based on non-adaptive attacks to an appendix). It is
nevertheless important to include a non-adaptive evaluation to demonstrate that simple methods
are insufficient. We hope that this paper can serve as a guide to performing and evaluating such
adaptive attacks.
Perhaps the most important lesson from our analysis is that adaptive attacks should be as simple
as possible, while resolving any potential optimization difficulties. Each new component added on
top of straightforward gradient descent is another place where errors can arise. On the whole we
are encouraged by the progress in defense evaluations over the past years, and hope that stronger
adaptive attacks evaluations will pave the way to more robust models.
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